Much Ado About Nothing: Future of War v. Clausewitz

In his latest article, Tom Ricks presents an interesting interpretation of Rosa Brooks’ latest piece, describing it as an attempt to “smackdown” 19th century strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his modern disciples. This would be unsurprising as Mrs. Brooks can exhibit a disdain for the old. But the semantic debate is meant to serve a more significant argument about the expanding use of military force to address contemporary threats.

After the release of a concept paper by the Future of War team, of which Mrs. Brooks is a member, Christopher Mewett at War On The Rocks challenged the team’s reference to “the changing nature of war” and cited Clausewitz’s assertion that the nature of war does not change, “But Warfare, of course, doesn't have an enduring, unchanging phenomenological ‘nature,’ as it is merely the way war is made.” Brooks acknowledged that, “War and warfare are different words with a different meaning, and we should be careful about their use.” She challenges, however, that the nature of war is unchanging.

A better phrasing of both points would be to acknowledge that war is as Clausewitz defined it, having many shades and characters but one nature, and that war is also merely one dimension of conflict. Warfare can thus be thought of not so much as the way war is made but the way conflicts are fought, in whatever realm they occur, military or otherwise.

The West has traditionally viewed conflict as ultimately embodied and principally resolved through war, as if the round hole of conflict must be refashioned to fit the square peg of war. This view is in no small part due to the influence of Clausewitz as well as the west’s own dominance in the conventional military realm. The East, however, has often practiced a different philosophy. Examples of this approach can be seen in Communism’s “shift from the battlefield of armies to the battlefield of classes” as described by J.F.C. Fuller, or the writing of the two Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels which provide a comprehensive view of conflict that includes other dimensions such as terror, cyber, financial and economic combat (or warfare). Especially relevant is the apparent Chinese strategy of denying a decisive transition to war in order to achieve its current goals in the Pacific. The Western hang-up on the term “war” is echoed in Mrs. Brooks article, which highlights how it is misapplied to other dimensions of conflict. But, in this piece and several others, Mrs. Brooks still presents it as one of only two possible options for dealing with entire spectrum of conflict, law or war.

If the 19th century’s most brilliant theorist can cause readers to become lost in the trees, the most brilliant theorist of the 20th century can help them take a step back to see the forest. John R. Boyd understood and valued Clausewitz but he also takes a broader view than both the Prussian’s work and the addendum offered by the Chinese colonels’ unrestricted warfare. Boyd dispensed, in many cases, with the narrow focus on the term “war” and in his corpus of work the word “competition” stands out much more — exemplifying the understanding of conflict as much more than just war.

Cavalier use of the term “war”—as in Mrs. Brooks’ references to the prevalence of terms like “cyber war” and “financial war”—is not done to enhance the logical and philosophical understandings of the topic but largely for political motives or for lack of a better term. Just because many people inaccurately use a term in certain contexts does not redefine it. These statements are in fact an argument for a more strict and narrow interpretation of war. Discrete boundaries are the key to preventing the expansion of the term and its accompanying increase the potential uses of military force and, more importantly, the effects war has on society.

Ricks quotes Brooks as positing that, “Clausewitzian strict constructionists will then respond, ‘You can blather on all you want about cyberwar or financial war, but if what you're talking about is not both violent and political, it's just not war, but something else.’” He goes on to note that Mrs. Brooks’ response is that, “…there are many other ways to understand and define violence. Consider various forms of psychological torture or abuse. Or consider cyber attacks that lead to loss of life as an indirect result of extended power outages. Why not view such attacks as a form of violence if they lead predictably to loss of life?"

A logical fallacy is at work here. If Clausewitzians say that all war is violent, it doesn’t mean that all violence is (or should be defined as) war. Further, the state may have a monopoly on violence but the military does not. The contemporary debate over responsibility for drone operations demonstrates different schools of thought in this regard. A case for redefining war must be made, not simply assumed.

It is also seems as though Ricks is implying that when competition exceeds the boundaries of war, the military is still the best arm for executing policy in these realms: “Then Brooks gets all neo-Westphalian on their asses. ‘It is the state that creates and defines the role of the military....It is also the state that defines the legal contours of war.’ So, for a truly subordinate military, war might be war, but war is what your civilian superiors say it is.”

But, as has been previously noted, there is no need to redefine violence or war to understand that “non-military” conflict exists and must be addressed. Such redefinition merely muddies the waters and extends a concept’s meaning far past its usefulness. Semantically changing the meaning of war to envelope the whole, or a much larger, area of competition will do little to solve our current problems and is likely to cause more of them. The military is raised, organized, equipped and trained for war as it has been defined by our Prussian theorist—not as whatever policymakers decide to call war. We have recently witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan what occurs when the military is asked to do everything, especially those things which are outside the purview of “war,” and without adequate interagency support. We have also seen that, even within the military realm, shifting focus from one method of warfighting to another tends to detract from the capability to conduct the former (e.g., the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War). Some outspoken U.S. commentators have warned of this as well. The capability to fight and win wars is still very much needed and must be maintained. As the saying goes, “When you try to do everything well, you end up doing nothing well.” This does not mean that the military cannot or should not engage in the cyber realm. It simply means that we must identify which framework a form of conflict falls into and determine the best tools and methods to deal with it. Setting aside the cyber warfare discussion and looking instead at “financial warfare” helps illustrate this. In realms outside of war, we may be better served by designing appropriate tools and responses for those arenas outside of war, rather than trying to tell the hammer that to hammer now means to screw, drill, and grip as well.

Mrs. Brooks points out that the state may choose which wars to fight and how to fight them, but this is merely defining a war or number of wars, not the essence of war itself. Mewett’s argument is still valid—as history has shown that the state is often in a reactionary mode rather than a managerial one when it comes to fighting—war influences the state as much as the state directs a war.

Brooks acknowledges this, describing it as a feedback loop and states that war, “can change the relationship between individuals and the state -- by altering ’rights’" for instance, or altering the degree to which the state's use of power is subject to internal checks and balances. Ultimately, by adding more to the war basket, the state may set in motion a cascade of changes that end by transforming the state itself.”

Indeed, the prosecution of the “War on Terror” has fundamentally changed American society in many ways, redefining how we think of both liberty and security.

In Ricks’ own column, an excellent piece by COL C. Anthony Pfaff notes the dangers of doing inherent when these changes result in expanding the concept of war: “However, given that the debate over the nature vs. character of war is largely a linguistic exercise (I don't mean to trivialize it -- words do matter), there is at least some utility in favoring the view that war's nature doesn't change and that it is inherently violent. Otherwise, metaphorical uses of the term could conceivably be employed to justify the use of military force in response to non-military "acts of aggression." Such a situation could set conditions for increased violent conflict, which under our current understanding of war would not be justified.”

Rather than an orchestration by the state, all conflict—especially war—must be viewed not simply as a struggle between two adversaries but also as a struggle between each and the act of war itself. One can win victory but lose oneself in the process. Mrs. Brooks often seems to be advocating for approaches that would actually result in this outcome.

In some ways, the Clausewitzian understanding of war could be viewed as a guide for when military force should be used, or even as a constraint against its excessive use. In this view, discarding it or saying it does not apply is likely to facilitate expansion and redefinition of war.

The semantic “tug-of-war” (pun intended) about defining “war” and “violence” is unnecessary, unless one is trying to expand it, and justify an escalatory, one-size-fits-all military response, as Brooks hints at: “Tell it to the Marines, or the Hellfire missile, whichever comes first.”

The Marines or a Hellfire may very well be the appropriate response but, as practitioners know, the application of violence tends to be a bit more nuanced than academics imagine.

The idea that there are only two choices, between law and war, between liberty and security, is a false dilemma that will lead to both being distorted in order to address problems for which they equally inappropriate. When this is done, not only does efficacy suffer but dangerous consequences emerge, as we have noted previously:

“These pre-existing frameworks [the legal framework and the military framework] emerged to address different challenges than those to which they are now being applied. This is not crime, this is not war and neither approach can sufficiently address the problem when the threat does not fall fully into either category. As such, these approaches have been expanded, modified and essentially stretched. The result has been confusion, indecision, and usurpation. On the one hand, the excessive prohibitions of the war framework hamper our effectiveness in combating non-state actors outside our boundaries, as seen in the failed Somalia raid, controversy over rendition programs, and the continuing issue of how to handle the Guantanamo detainees. On the other hand, the legal framework is being perverted by increasingly oppressive measures, such as the classification of citizens as enemy combatants, drone killings of citizens, and unbridled government surveillance — clearly undermining civil liberty within our borders.”

The current situation, embodied in the about how to address current threats, is the result of the nation not being able to choose between two equally bad options. Brooks thinks we need to just pick one and accept the consequences. Instead, we need to create another option.

Responsibility To Protect - Rhetoric and Reality

Victor Allan and Mark Safranski have initiated an engaging  discussion at The Bridge and Zenpundit about Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the idea that states are responsible for protecting their populations and when they cannot protect them, the international community is obligated to assist them in an escalating manner until the desired result is achieved.  It is an important discussion to have given that the United States incorporated R2P in its 2010 National Security Strategy and the doctrine is likely to appear in the 2014 document.  Further, R2P has been consistently cited by advocates for U.S. intervention in Uganda, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and so on and thus continues to play a prominent role in U.S. foreign affairs. 

First, a brief recap of the discussion:

Victor attempts to circumvent the pesky issues regarding R2P and state sovereignty by simply redefining sovereignty.   Mark has pointed out that “Academic theorists do not have the authority to override sovereign powers (!) constituted as legitimized, recognized states and write their theories into international law,” and highlights that several members of the U.N. Security Council disagree with the interpretation of sovereignty that Victor advocates.  Mark also states that it is a straw man argument to claim that nations ever had carte blanche within their borders, at least concerning the security concerns of their neighbors, as Victor asserts.  The latest response by Victor emphasizes the lesser forms of intervention under the doctrine, focusing on an escalating level of intervention and then points out that R2P is not the product of academic theorists but was adopted by the U.N. Security Council.  He then implies that neighbor state involvement in a nation, as referenced by Mark, represents a stealth argument for R2P principles. 

I will leave aside semantic difficulties in applying R2P, like determining when violence becomes genocide, when civil war becomes ethnic cleansing or why hundreds of chemical weapon deaths is a human rights violation but tens of thousands killed by bullets or bombs is not.  I will simply point out that malleable criteria, such as those outlined in describing the doctrine, are typically chosen to allow a wider and more expansive interpretation and should be viewed as a warning sign.  

Before addressing the logic of the arguments, it is important to examine the empirical evidence.  Results are what count when evaluating a policy, not its intent.  Adoption of R2P has failed to make a significant impact on recent violence across the globe; Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, and Syria all offer examples. Victor points out that “most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population,” but few were willing (or capable) of taking action.  Rhetoric is cheap but action requires effort and thus speaks better to true attitudes.  Despite what is said, R2P has not proven to be a desirable policy to pursue for most nations and as such has not been frequently applied, however much it is mentioned.  While R2P is certainly compassionate in its intent, it can be argued that unintended consequences from its application will cause more harm than good.  Rarely can a foreign power solve a nation’s internal problems, and usually attempts to do so only temporarily alleviate them, or make them worse. Contemporary evidence can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya where in each case current conditions are arguably worse than before intervention.  This is ironic as R2P was part of the pitch for intervening, or at least extending intervention, in all of these cases.  The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, has noted that the intervention in Libya was conducted not to combat actual crimes against humanity, but as a preemptive measure, creating a precedent with the potential for considerable abuse.  Not only do legitimate attempts often end in failure, and at greater cost to all parties involved, but some nations have gone even further and used R2P as justification for war, without the ‘legalizing’ power of U.N. approval, as in Russia’s conflict with Georgia.  When viewed in this light, comparing the dangers created and the failures of the policy to prevent mass violence with how many crises have been actually been averted, R2P has not proven to be a successful or even a neutral doctrine, but a harmful one.  Despite claims that this is due to poor implementation or a lack thereof, the problem is not in application, it is inherent in the concept itself.   

Although Victor accuses Mark and others of misrepresenting R2P, his definition appears to be the one that is shifting.  Calling one nation’s intervention in another to secure its own interests R2P is a misnomer.  Mark cites actions that a neighbor state may take in relation to another as driven by its own security concerns, not as a result of an idealistic duty imposed to protect the citizens of its neighboring state.  In Victor’s first article, this is the same justification he uses for R2P imposing duties on the global community—the idea that internal instability can cause effects outside a nation’s borders and so justifies intervention.  His second article continues with this line of logic.  But this is simply selling intervention on the basis of national interest, rather than mandating a responsibility to intervene based on humanitarian concerns.

Also, an appeal to authority such as the U.N. is a misplaced justification.  The U.N. is not a governing body, nor is the Security Council the highest authority “on interventions, peacemaking, and peacekeeping….” as Victor asserts.  The Security Council has no authority except that which is derived from the power of its member states.  Further, what is referred to as “international law” is in reality handshake deals and custom rather than “law”.  The legality of NATO intervention in Kosovo would have been the same with or without U.N. Security Council approval, as it is not a supra-governmental organization with powers that supersede state sovereignty.  An action taken by several nations under a U.N. mandate is legally and morally no different than an action taken by several nations without such a mandate, or by one nation acting unilaterally.  Multilateral approaches have been generally preferred over unilateral ones for practical purposes and not reasons of moral justification.  When multilateralism has been the chosen course of action, it has largely been window dressing for action that is primarily in the national interests of certain member states.  Further, state sovereignty is the check on the tyranny of the majority in the international system but the U.N. operates on the assumption that consent of its members justifies violations of state sovereignty.  In this way, the U.N. derives its “authority” from mob rule.  Favoring international intimidation over national sovereignty is a precarious way to justify action.  

Additionally, when advocating for R2P, there seems to be a habit of cherry-picking which definitions to apply, rather than applying the principle universally.  According to Victor, "The question then becomes one of how best to balance the sovereignty of the state with the need to protect its populations."  Again, this seems only an issue when defining sovereignty in a Westphalian sense.  In the Deng, et al. interpretation of sovereignty cited by Victor, sovereignty is derived from the ability to protect the population hence, when there is no ability, there is no sovereignty with which to be concerned.  A practical example of the advocacy for a new interpretation of sovereignty being undermined by an attempt to honor its old definition can be seen in the arbitrary distinction between natural disaster and human-caused action.  If it is a state's responsibility to protect its people, and it cannot do so in a natural disaster, then why does this not warrant intervention?  What if people are dying from starvation and the state is unable to help?  Why does the state only bear responsibility to protect people from certain kinds of harm if sovereignty is responsibility?  Did not al-Shabaab’s inability to deal with drought that lead to the 2011 famines warrant intervention?  If not, then what about when the group prevented refugees from leaving the country, forcing them to stay and starve?   From a people-based sovereignty point of view, there is no logical distinction between death caused by a lack of ability to distribute food, an earthquake or violence by another group.  In either case, if the state cannot protect its citizenry and does not consent to help, there should be no distinction unless one was concerned about violating the sovereignty of the state in the Westphalian sense of the word.   This distinction is arbitrarily made to limit the type of open-ended commitments asked of the global community, rather than mandating what would, in reality, never be agreed to.  Another example is the emphasis on a spectrum of responses, which imply that it is wrong to violate sovereignty, unless it is done a little bit at a time.  It seems as though as much as there is an assertion of a new interpretation of sovereignty, even its proponents are acting as if this is interpretation is not the reality.

My main observation, however, is that the discussion thus far has been focused more on a "right" to protect than a "responsibility" to do so.  The arguments indicate that a state has a responsibility to protect its people but takes for granted that third parties somehow inherit this responsibility when the state cannot fulfill it.  There is a missing explanation here.  The need to justify such efforts may seem callous, but a nation’s highest moral order is to serve its own citizens first.  Such an explanation would certainly be a legitimate demand for a mother that loses a son who volunteered to defend his nation, or for a government entrusted by its people to use their resources to their own benefit.  While it is often stated that the international community "should" intervene, explanation of where this imperative comes from is not addressed other than by vague references to modern states being interconnected.  But this implies, as previously stated, a right based on the self-interest of states, firmly grounded in realistic security concerns, rather than any inherent humanitarian responsibility to intervene.

Instability and potential spillover may very well make it within a nation’s vital interests to intervene in  another country and pursuing humanitarian and human rights goals within the borders of another state may well be in a nation’s secondary interests.  But if this is the case, the calculus of the political leadership will determine if pursuing this goal is worth the cost/potential costs – as has been done in such cases as North Korea, Iran, Zimbabwe, Tibet and Syria.  In either case, the decision is determined by what is in the nation’s interests, a reality that makes R2P not a mandate, but a merely a post hoc justification for intervention.


*Title inspired by Thomas Sowell's book, "Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality"