The Old Approach

Suppose that 60 years ago we gave Maine to Canada, as a gift. Suppose that we still maintained military forces there and that our main naval base for the Atlantic was in Maine and leased from Canada, along with other military installations. Now suppose that Canada has recently undergone a rapid and somewhat violent change of government from an administration that was friendly to the U.S. to a regime that is vehemently anti-American. Suppose that the Americans in Maine began discussing and advocating secession from this hostile Canadian government and reuniting with the U.S., even raising American flags in major cities and taking to the streets in protests in support of such actions. Suppose that Governor of Maine asked for American troops to come and safeguard his people from a hostile government they no longer feel represents them.

From the U.S. standpoint, it would be perfectly natural, and necessary, to secure its bases in this territory and protect the population by sending in more security forces, despite protests of Canadians about their sovereignty. 

Now substitute Russia for the U.S., Ukraine for Canada, and Crimea for Maine and one is left with a more accurate picture of what is occurring than the narrative of “invasion” that is being presented by Western media, and political officials. 

In fact, the only legitimate complaint against Russia’s action is that they technically violated Ukrainian sovereignty. But sadly, the U.S. has, for years, embraced the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which encourages and even demands violating this sense of sovereignty in order to protect populations. 

Of course, the analogy is not perfect, and Russia has strategic interests here, but for hundreds of years the U.S. has engaged in far less justifiable interventions both within its own sphere of influence, and outside of it. We even had a name for the type of meddling in our neighbors’ affairs that Russia is practicing, the Monroe Doctrine. For the U.S. to criticize the Russians in engaging in requested intervention within their own sphere is hypocritical in the most generous characterization.

Even, this article by Jeremy Kotkin, uses the language of invasion, but it does, however, offer a refreshing exception to the U.S. perspective of the crisis. Kotkin examines Russia’s actions in the context of 20 years of NATO marginalization, antagonism and encroachment. 

He points out that, “US and NATO actions over the past two decades have, without question, led Russia to believe that it will not be a part of NATO and, as such, not part of ‘Europe’…the growing perception was that Russia was to be not only left out, but also kept out of the European fold. The feelings of rejection and inferiority began to foment Soviet chauvinism and the suspicion that the US is extending its military and political influence at Russia’s expense and, in fact, into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.”

He provides an example in the agreement to unify Germany, which included promises that NATO would not move further east, noting that, “After the Soviet Union fell, the US and its European partners deliberately took advantage of a weakened Russia to incorporate her former allies and even some former Soviet republics into the NATO alliance.”

There are some commentators, such as ‘Jack Hays,’ who liken the move in Crimea to Germany appropriating ethnically-German lands in the 1930s. The implication is that the world is currently engaged in Chamberlainesque appeasement that will lead to war. Kotkin points to a better analogy – Kosovo:

 “Another factor provoking this Russian reaction was the West’s recognition of Kosovo, the secessionist province of Serbia. This “sovereign state” has a staunch Russian-allied (Orthodox) population. Russia would rhetorically ask, ‘If the US supported self-determination for Kosovo Muslims, then why not for Georgia’s breakaway regions?’ The same psychology is obviously in play as they move to guarantee Crimean independence. In all cases, a smaller ethnic minority in one country is trying to rejoin a larger ethnic community across the border and out from an arguably artificial border. However, the US and European allies ignored Russia’s protests and recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia anyway. This was done outside of a formal UN mandate and, therefore, technically, outside of international law. Despite Secretary of State Rice’s arguments that the Kosovo situation was unique, Russia had nonetheless leveraged the Kosovo precedent as justification for its actions in Georgia and now the Crimea.”

By opposing the Russians in Crimea, the U.S. only further reveals that its true agenda has not been about liberal values but about stymieing the Russians. We should further be careful about picking sides between a revolutionary government likely to be as corrupt as the one it replaced and a region that could be viewed as desiring self-determination turning to their parent nation. Vocalizing support for Ukrainians in throwing off their Russian yoke, courtesy of Yanukovych, and then refusing to acknowledge a Russian people's desire to be free of Ukrainian domination is likely to undermine our desired image and political capital on the world stage.

The bill for the U.S. past actions in the region is finally coming due. Kotkin notes, “Moscow clearly warned that Western actions in Kosovo would set a dangerous international precedent. Even more ominously, Russia specifically cited South Ossetia and Abkhazia as places where the US’s “Kosovo precedent” would apply. Regardless of the differences between Kosovo, Georgia, and now Crimea, Moscow has been trying to tell the West that it cannot provoke Russia without expecting Russia, at some point, to respond in kind.”

Beyond our pride, who rules in Crimea is not vital to the U.S. For Russia, on the other hand, it is a vital interest, potentially worth fighting over. In the West the response has been stern warnings and blatant threats directed at Russia. Many commentators are suggesting even sterner action. ADM (RET) Stavridis, in a recent piece, emphasized the need for a strong NATO response in all aspects of national power, including military preparations. To have our bluff called would further undermine U.S. credibility (already damaged from Syria) and create exactly the kind of situation Europe faced in teh 1930s, when Britain’s threats were viewed by Hitler as not credible. To actually go to war would be utterly disastrous for all parties. 

We should have learned from our "redline" experience not to conduct "unconsidered" foreign policy but rather to be more cautious in our approaches. We have not done well in reactive mode. Rather than calculated policymaking, as exemplified in this article by Robert C. Rasmussen, many are advocating playing a game of chicken that we are not committed to winning because we know full well that it is a battle not worth fighting.

Alex Ward accurately noted that despite the rhetoric, the U.S. interest in Crimea is not about protecting sovereignty, or a people’s self-determination, or even about “containing” rather than appeasing the Russians. It is really about our own frustration with our declining influence in the world. 

A further blow to our self-image should come from the fact that despite our stance, our allies are not convinced. Whether it is for fear of war, the European needs for Russian gas, or a desire to avoid hypocrisy, both Germany and Great Britain will not support proposed sanctions against Russia. Further, U.S. action may be pushing our perceived future adversary into alignment with our former adversary.

We have been one step behind Russia through the entire crisis in Ukraine, and we are predictably stuck in our traditional model for dealing with crises of this manner. The problem is that for the past 70 years the old approach has relied on us holding the position of power, but as we are increasingly discovering, our influenced is waning. In this crisis, Russia does not have to be be stronger than the U.S, just stronger where it matters. This should be understood as we rev the propaganda machines up about ‘invasion,’ and start trying to brow-beat nations into economic sanctions or moving military forces into the region.

Much Ado About Nothing: Future of War v. Clausewitz

In his latest article, Tom Ricks presents an interesting interpretation of Rosa Brooks’ latest piece, describing it as an attempt to “smackdown” 19th century strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his modern disciples. This would be unsurprising as Mrs. Brooks can exhibit a disdain for the old. But the semantic debate is meant to serve a more significant argument about the expanding use of military force to address contemporary threats.

After the release of a concept paper by the Future of War team, of which Mrs. Brooks is a member, Christopher Mewett at War On The Rocks challenged the team’s reference to “the changing nature of war” and cited Clausewitz’s assertion that the nature of war does not change, “But Warfare, of course, doesn't have an enduring, unchanging phenomenological ‘nature,’ as it is merely the way war is made.” Brooks acknowledged that, “War and warfare are different words with a different meaning, and we should be careful about their use.” She challenges, however, that the nature of war is unchanging.

A better phrasing of both points would be to acknowledge that war is as Clausewitz defined it, having many shades and characters but one nature, and that war is also merely one dimension of conflict. Warfare can thus be thought of not so much as the way war is made but the way conflicts are fought, in whatever realm they occur, military or otherwise.

The West has traditionally viewed conflict as ultimately embodied and principally resolved through war, as if the round hole of conflict must be refashioned to fit the square peg of war. This view is in no small part due to the influence of Clausewitz as well as the west’s own dominance in the conventional military realm. The East, however, has often practiced a different philosophy. Examples of this approach can be seen in Communism’s “shift from the battlefield of armies to the battlefield of classes” as described by J.F.C. Fuller, or the writing of the two Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels which provide a comprehensive view of conflict that includes other dimensions such as terror, cyber, financial and economic combat (or warfare). Especially relevant is the apparent Chinese strategy of denying a decisive transition to war in order to achieve its current goals in the Pacific. The Western hang-up on the term “war” is echoed in Mrs. Brooks article, which highlights how it is misapplied to other dimensions of conflict. But, in this piece and several others, Mrs. Brooks still presents it as one of only two possible options for dealing with entire spectrum of conflict, law or war.

If the 19th century’s most brilliant theorist can cause readers to become lost in the trees, the most brilliant theorist of the 20th century can help them take a step back to see the forest. John R. Boyd understood and valued Clausewitz but he also takes a broader view than both the Prussian’s work and the addendum offered by the Chinese colonels’ unrestricted warfare. Boyd dispensed, in many cases, with the narrow focus on the term “war” and in his corpus of work the word “competition” stands out much more — exemplifying the understanding of conflict as much more than just war.

Cavalier use of the term “war”—as in Mrs. Brooks’ references to the prevalence of terms like “cyber war” and “financial war”—is not done to enhance the logical and philosophical understandings of the topic but largely for political motives or for lack of a better term. Just because many people inaccurately use a term in certain contexts does not redefine it. These statements are in fact an argument for a more strict and narrow interpretation of war. Discrete boundaries are the key to preventing the expansion of the term and its accompanying increase the potential uses of military force and, more importantly, the effects war has on society.

Ricks quotes Brooks as positing that, “Clausewitzian strict constructionists will then respond, ‘You can blather on all you want about cyberwar or financial war, but if what you're talking about is not both violent and political, it's just not war, but something else.’” He goes on to note that Mrs. Brooks’ response is that, “…there are many other ways to understand and define violence. Consider various forms of psychological torture or abuse. Or consider cyber attacks that lead to loss of life as an indirect result of extended power outages. Why not view such attacks as a form of violence if they lead predictably to loss of life?"

A logical fallacy is at work here. If Clausewitzians say that all war is violent, it doesn’t mean that all violence is (or should be defined as) war. Further, the state may have a monopoly on violence but the military does not. The contemporary debate over responsibility for drone operations demonstrates different schools of thought in this regard. A case for redefining war must be made, not simply assumed.

It is also seems as though Ricks is implying that when competition exceeds the boundaries of war, the military is still the best arm for executing policy in these realms: “Then Brooks gets all neo-Westphalian on their asses. ‘It is the state that creates and defines the role of the military....It is also the state that defines the legal contours of war.’ So, for a truly subordinate military, war might be war, but war is what your civilian superiors say it is.”

But, as has been previously noted, there is no need to redefine violence or war to understand that “non-military” conflict exists and must be addressed. Such redefinition merely muddies the waters and extends a concept’s meaning far past its usefulness. Semantically changing the meaning of war to envelope the whole, or a much larger, area of competition will do little to solve our current problems and is likely to cause more of them. The military is raised, organized, equipped and trained for war as it has been defined by our Prussian theorist—not as whatever policymakers decide to call war. We have recently witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan what occurs when the military is asked to do everything, especially those things which are outside the purview of “war,” and without adequate interagency support. We have also seen that, even within the military realm, shifting focus from one method of warfighting to another tends to detract from the capability to conduct the former (e.g., the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War). Some outspoken U.S. commentators have warned of this as well. The capability to fight and win wars is still very much needed and must be maintained. As the saying goes, “When you try to do everything well, you end up doing nothing well.” This does not mean that the military cannot or should not engage in the cyber realm. It simply means that we must identify which framework a form of conflict falls into and determine the best tools and methods to deal with it. Setting aside the cyber warfare discussion and looking instead at “financial warfare” helps illustrate this. In realms outside of war, we may be better served by designing appropriate tools and responses for those arenas outside of war, rather than trying to tell the hammer that to hammer now means to screw, drill, and grip as well.

Mrs. Brooks points out that the state may choose which wars to fight and how to fight them, but this is merely defining a war or number of wars, not the essence of war itself. Mewett’s argument is still valid—as history has shown that the state is often in a reactionary mode rather than a managerial one when it comes to fighting—war influences the state as much as the state directs a war.

Brooks acknowledges this, describing it as a feedback loop and states that war, “can change the relationship between individuals and the state -- by altering ’rights’" for instance, or altering the degree to which the state's use of power is subject to internal checks and balances. Ultimately, by adding more to the war basket, the state may set in motion a cascade of changes that end by transforming the state itself.”

Indeed, the prosecution of the “War on Terror” has fundamentally changed American society in many ways, redefining how we think of both liberty and security.

In Ricks’ own column, an excellent piece by COL C. Anthony Pfaff notes the dangers of doing inherent when these changes result in expanding the concept of war: “However, given that the debate over the nature vs. character of war is largely a linguistic exercise (I don't mean to trivialize it -- words do matter), there is at least some utility in favoring the view that war's nature doesn't change and that it is inherently violent. Otherwise, metaphorical uses of the term could conceivably be employed to justify the use of military force in response to non-military "acts of aggression." Such a situation could set conditions for increased violent conflict, which under our current understanding of war would not be justified.”

Rather than an orchestration by the state, all conflict—especially war—must be viewed not simply as a struggle between two adversaries but also as a struggle between each and the act of war itself. One can win victory but lose oneself in the process. Mrs. Brooks often seems to be advocating for approaches that would actually result in this outcome.

In some ways, the Clausewitzian understanding of war could be viewed as a guide for when military force should be used, or even as a constraint against its excessive use. In this view, discarding it or saying it does not apply is likely to facilitate expansion and redefinition of war.

The semantic “tug-of-war” (pun intended) about defining “war” and “violence” is unnecessary, unless one is trying to expand it, and justify an escalatory, one-size-fits-all military response, as Brooks hints at: “Tell it to the Marines, or the Hellfire missile, whichever comes first.”

The Marines or a Hellfire may very well be the appropriate response but, as practitioners know, the application of violence tends to be a bit more nuanced than academics imagine.

The idea that there are only two choices, between law and war, between liberty and security, is a false dilemma that will lead to both being distorted in order to address problems for which they equally inappropriate. When this is done, not only does efficacy suffer but dangerous consequences emerge, as we have noted previously:

“These pre-existing frameworks [the legal framework and the military framework] emerged to address different challenges than those to which they are now being applied. This is not crime, this is not war and neither approach can sufficiently address the problem when the threat does not fall fully into either category. As such, these approaches have been expanded, modified and essentially stretched. The result has been confusion, indecision, and usurpation. On the one hand, the excessive prohibitions of the war framework hamper our effectiveness in combating non-state actors outside our boundaries, as seen in the failed Somalia raid, controversy over rendition programs, and the continuing issue of how to handle the Guantanamo detainees. On the other hand, the legal framework is being perverted by increasingly oppressive measures, such as the classification of citizens as enemy combatants, drone killings of citizens, and unbridled government surveillance — clearly undermining civil liberty within our borders.”

The current situation, embodied in the about how to address current threats, is the result of the nation not being able to choose between two equally bad options. Brooks thinks we need to just pick one and accept the consequences. Instead, we need to create another option.

Responsibility To Protect - Rhetoric and Reality

Victor Allan and Mark Safranski have initiated an engaging  discussion at The Bridge and Zenpundit about Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the idea that states are responsible for protecting their populations and when they cannot protect them, the international community is obligated to assist them in an escalating manner until the desired result is achieved.  It is an important discussion to have given that the United States incorporated R2P in its 2010 National Security Strategy and the doctrine is likely to appear in the 2014 document.  Further, R2P has been consistently cited by advocates for U.S. intervention in Uganda, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and so on and thus continues to play a prominent role in U.S. foreign affairs. 

First, a brief recap of the discussion:

Victor attempts to circumvent the pesky issues regarding R2P and state sovereignty by simply redefining sovereignty.   Mark has pointed out that “Academic theorists do not have the authority to override sovereign powers (!) constituted as legitimized, recognized states and write their theories into international law,” and highlights that several members of the U.N. Security Council disagree with the interpretation of sovereignty that Victor advocates.  Mark also states that it is a straw man argument to claim that nations ever had carte blanche within their borders, at least concerning the security concerns of their neighbors, as Victor asserts.  The latest response by Victor emphasizes the lesser forms of intervention under the doctrine, focusing on an escalating level of intervention and then points out that R2P is not the product of academic theorists but was adopted by the U.N. Security Council.  He then implies that neighbor state involvement in a nation, as referenced by Mark, represents a stealth argument for R2P principles. 

I will leave aside semantic difficulties in applying R2P, like determining when violence becomes genocide, when civil war becomes ethnic cleansing or why hundreds of chemical weapon deaths is a human rights violation but tens of thousands killed by bullets or bombs is not.  I will simply point out that malleable criteria, such as those outlined in describing the doctrine, are typically chosen to allow a wider and more expansive interpretation and should be viewed as a warning sign.  

Before addressing the logic of the arguments, it is important to examine the empirical evidence.  Results are what count when evaluating a policy, not its intent.  Adoption of R2P has failed to make a significant impact on recent violence across the globe; Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, and Syria all offer examples. Victor points out that “most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population,” but few were willing (or capable) of taking action.  Rhetoric is cheap but action requires effort and thus speaks better to true attitudes.  Despite what is said, R2P has not proven to be a desirable policy to pursue for most nations and as such has not been frequently applied, however much it is mentioned.  While R2P is certainly compassionate in its intent, it can be argued that unintended consequences from its application will cause more harm than good.  Rarely can a foreign power solve a nation’s internal problems, and usually attempts to do so only temporarily alleviate them, or make them worse. Contemporary evidence can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya where in each case current conditions are arguably worse than before intervention.  This is ironic as R2P was part of the pitch for intervening, or at least extending intervention, in all of these cases.  The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, has noted that the intervention in Libya was conducted not to combat actual crimes against humanity, but as a preemptive measure, creating a precedent with the potential for considerable abuse.  Not only do legitimate attempts often end in failure, and at greater cost to all parties involved, but some nations have gone even further and used R2P as justification for war, without the ‘legalizing’ power of U.N. approval, as in Russia’s conflict with Georgia.  When viewed in this light, comparing the dangers created and the failures of the policy to prevent mass violence with how many crises have been actually been averted, R2P has not proven to be a successful or even a neutral doctrine, but a harmful one.  Despite claims that this is due to poor implementation or a lack thereof, the problem is not in application, it is inherent in the concept itself.   

Although Victor accuses Mark and others of misrepresenting R2P, his definition appears to be the one that is shifting.  Calling one nation’s intervention in another to secure its own interests R2P is a misnomer.  Mark cites actions that a neighbor state may take in relation to another as driven by its own security concerns, not as a result of an idealistic duty imposed to protect the citizens of its neighboring state.  In Victor’s first article, this is the same justification he uses for R2P imposing duties on the global community—the idea that internal instability can cause effects outside a nation’s borders and so justifies intervention.  His second article continues with this line of logic.  But this is simply selling intervention on the basis of national interest, rather than mandating a responsibility to intervene based on humanitarian concerns.

Also, an appeal to authority such as the U.N. is a misplaced justification.  The U.N. is not a governing body, nor is the Security Council the highest authority “on interventions, peacemaking, and peacekeeping….” as Victor asserts.  The Security Council has no authority except that which is derived from the power of its member states.  Further, what is referred to as “international law” is in reality handshake deals and custom rather than “law”.  The legality of NATO intervention in Kosovo would have been the same with or without U.N. Security Council approval, as it is not a supra-governmental organization with powers that supersede state sovereignty.  An action taken by several nations under a U.N. mandate is legally and morally no different than an action taken by several nations without such a mandate, or by one nation acting unilaterally.  Multilateral approaches have been generally preferred over unilateral ones for practical purposes and not reasons of moral justification.  When multilateralism has been the chosen course of action, it has largely been window dressing for action that is primarily in the national interests of certain member states.  Further, state sovereignty is the check on the tyranny of the majority in the international system but the U.N. operates on the assumption that consent of its members justifies violations of state sovereignty.  In this way, the U.N. derives its “authority” from mob rule.  Favoring international intimidation over national sovereignty is a precarious way to justify action.  

Additionally, when advocating for R2P, there seems to be a habit of cherry-picking which definitions to apply, rather than applying the principle universally.  According to Victor, "The question then becomes one of how best to balance the sovereignty of the state with the need to protect its populations."  Again, this seems only an issue when defining sovereignty in a Westphalian sense.  In the Deng, et al. interpretation of sovereignty cited by Victor, sovereignty is derived from the ability to protect the population hence, when there is no ability, there is no sovereignty with which to be concerned.  A practical example of the advocacy for a new interpretation of sovereignty being undermined by an attempt to honor its old definition can be seen in the arbitrary distinction between natural disaster and human-caused action.  If it is a state's responsibility to protect its people, and it cannot do so in a natural disaster, then why does this not warrant intervention?  What if people are dying from starvation and the state is unable to help?  Why does the state only bear responsibility to protect people from certain kinds of harm if sovereignty is responsibility?  Did not al-Shabaab’s inability to deal with drought that lead to the 2011 famines warrant intervention?  If not, then what about when the group prevented refugees from leaving the country, forcing them to stay and starve?   From a people-based sovereignty point of view, there is no logical distinction between death caused by a lack of ability to distribute food, an earthquake or violence by another group.  In either case, if the state cannot protect its citizenry and does not consent to help, there should be no distinction unless one was concerned about violating the sovereignty of the state in the Westphalian sense of the word.   This distinction is arbitrarily made to limit the type of open-ended commitments asked of the global community, rather than mandating what would, in reality, never be agreed to.  Another example is the emphasis on a spectrum of responses, which imply that it is wrong to violate sovereignty, unless it is done a little bit at a time.  It seems as though as much as there is an assertion of a new interpretation of sovereignty, even its proponents are acting as if this is interpretation is not the reality.

My main observation, however, is that the discussion thus far has been focused more on a "right" to protect than a "responsibility" to do so.  The arguments indicate that a state has a responsibility to protect its people but takes for granted that third parties somehow inherit this responsibility when the state cannot fulfill it.  There is a missing explanation here.  The need to justify such efforts may seem callous, but a nation’s highest moral order is to serve its own citizens first.  Such an explanation would certainly be a legitimate demand for a mother that loses a son who volunteered to defend his nation, or for a government entrusted by its people to use their resources to their own benefit.  While it is often stated that the international community "should" intervene, explanation of where this imperative comes from is not addressed other than by vague references to modern states being interconnected.  But this implies, as previously stated, a right based on the self-interest of states, firmly grounded in realistic security concerns, rather than any inherent humanitarian responsibility to intervene.

Instability and potential spillover may very well make it within a nation’s vital interests to intervene in  another country and pursuing humanitarian and human rights goals within the borders of another state may well be in a nation’s secondary interests.  But if this is the case, the calculus of the political leadership will determine if pursuing this goal is worth the cost/potential costs – as has been done in such cases as North Korea, Iran, Zimbabwe, Tibet and Syria.  In either case, the decision is determined by what is in the nation’s interests, a reality that makes R2P not a mandate, but a merely a post hoc justification for intervention.


*Title inspired by Thomas Sowell's book, "Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality"