The Old Approach

Suppose that 60 years ago we gave Maine to Canada, as a gift. Suppose that we still maintained military forces there and that our main naval base for the Atlantic was in Maine and leased from Canada, along with other military installations. Now suppose that Canada has recently undergone a rapid and somewhat violent change of government from an administration that was friendly to the U.S. to a regime that is vehemently anti-American. Suppose that the Americans in Maine began discussing and advocating secession from this hostile Canadian government and reuniting with the U.S., even raising American flags in major cities and taking to the streets in protests in support of such actions. Suppose that Governor of Maine asked for American troops to come and safeguard his people from a hostile government they no longer feel represents them.

From the U.S. standpoint, it would be perfectly natural, and necessary, to secure its bases in this territory and protect the population by sending in more security forces, despite protests of Canadians about their sovereignty. 

Now substitute Russia for the U.S., Ukraine for Canada, and Crimea for Maine and one is left with a more accurate picture of what is occurring than the narrative of “invasion” that is being presented by Western media, and political officials. 

In fact, the only legitimate complaint against Russia’s action is that they technically violated Ukrainian sovereignty. But sadly, the U.S. has, for years, embraced the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which encourages and even demands violating this sense of sovereignty in order to protect populations. 

Of course, the analogy is not perfect, and Russia has strategic interests here, but for hundreds of years the U.S. has engaged in far less justifiable interventions both within its own sphere of influence, and outside of it. We even had a name for the type of meddling in our neighbors’ affairs that Russia is practicing, the Monroe Doctrine. For the U.S. to criticize the Russians in engaging in requested intervention within their own sphere is hypocritical in the most generous characterization.

Even, this article by Jeremy Kotkin, uses the language of invasion, but it does, however, offer a refreshing exception to the U.S. perspective of the crisis. Kotkin examines Russia’s actions in the context of 20 years of NATO marginalization, antagonism and encroachment. 

He points out that, “US and NATO actions over the past two decades have, without question, led Russia to believe that it will not be a part of NATO and, as such, not part of ‘Europe’…the growing perception was that Russia was to be not only left out, but also kept out of the European fold. The feelings of rejection and inferiority began to foment Soviet chauvinism and the suspicion that the US is extending its military and political influence at Russia’s expense and, in fact, into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.”

He provides an example in the agreement to unify Germany, which included promises that NATO would not move further east, noting that, “After the Soviet Union fell, the US and its European partners deliberately took advantage of a weakened Russia to incorporate her former allies and even some former Soviet republics into the NATO alliance.”

There are some commentators, such as ‘Jack Hays,’ who liken the move in Crimea to Germany appropriating ethnically-German lands in the 1930s. The implication is that the world is currently engaged in Chamberlainesque appeasement that will lead to war. Kotkin points to a better analogy – Kosovo:

 “Another factor provoking this Russian reaction was the West’s recognition of Kosovo, the secessionist province of Serbia. This “sovereign state” has a staunch Russian-allied (Orthodox) population. Russia would rhetorically ask, ‘If the US supported self-determination for Kosovo Muslims, then why not for Georgia’s breakaway regions?’ The same psychology is obviously in play as they move to guarantee Crimean independence. In all cases, a smaller ethnic minority in one country is trying to rejoin a larger ethnic community across the border and out from an arguably artificial border. However, the US and European allies ignored Russia’s protests and recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia anyway. This was done outside of a formal UN mandate and, therefore, technically, outside of international law. Despite Secretary of State Rice’s arguments that the Kosovo situation was unique, Russia had nonetheless leveraged the Kosovo precedent as justification for its actions in Georgia and now the Crimea.”

By opposing the Russians in Crimea, the U.S. only further reveals that its true agenda has not been about liberal values but about stymieing the Russians. We should further be careful about picking sides between a revolutionary government likely to be as corrupt as the one it replaced and a region that could be viewed as desiring self-determination turning to their parent nation. Vocalizing support for Ukrainians in throwing off their Russian yoke, courtesy of Yanukovych, and then refusing to acknowledge a Russian people's desire to be free of Ukrainian domination is likely to undermine our desired image and political capital on the world stage.

The bill for the U.S. past actions in the region is finally coming due. Kotkin notes, “Moscow clearly warned that Western actions in Kosovo would set a dangerous international precedent. Even more ominously, Russia specifically cited South Ossetia and Abkhazia as places where the US’s “Kosovo precedent” would apply. Regardless of the differences between Kosovo, Georgia, and now Crimea, Moscow has been trying to tell the West that it cannot provoke Russia without expecting Russia, at some point, to respond in kind.”

Beyond our pride, who rules in Crimea is not vital to the U.S. For Russia, on the other hand, it is a vital interest, potentially worth fighting over. In the West the response has been stern warnings and blatant threats directed at Russia. Many commentators are suggesting even sterner action. ADM (RET) Stavridis, in a recent piece, emphasized the need for a strong NATO response in all aspects of national power, including military preparations. To have our bluff called would further undermine U.S. credibility (already damaged from Syria) and create exactly the kind of situation Europe faced in teh 1930s, when Britain’s threats were viewed by Hitler as not credible. To actually go to war would be utterly disastrous for all parties. 

We should have learned from our "redline" experience not to conduct "unconsidered" foreign policy but rather to be more cautious in our approaches. We have not done well in reactive mode. Rather than calculated policymaking, as exemplified in this article by Robert C. Rasmussen, many are advocating playing a game of chicken that we are not committed to winning because we know full well that it is a battle not worth fighting.

Alex Ward accurately noted that despite the rhetoric, the U.S. interest in Crimea is not about protecting sovereignty, or a people’s self-determination, or even about “containing” rather than appeasing the Russians. It is really about our own frustration with our declining influence in the world. 

A further blow to our self-image should come from the fact that despite our stance, our allies are not convinced. Whether it is for fear of war, the European needs for Russian gas, or a desire to avoid hypocrisy, both Germany and Great Britain will not support proposed sanctions against Russia. Further, U.S. action may be pushing our perceived future adversary into alignment with our former adversary.

We have been one step behind Russia through the entire crisis in Ukraine, and we are predictably stuck in our traditional model for dealing with crises of this manner. The problem is that for the past 70 years the old approach has relied on us holding the position of power, but as we are increasingly discovering, our influenced is waning. In this crisis, Russia does not have to be be stronger than the U.S, just stronger where it matters. This should be understood as we rev the propaganda machines up about ‘invasion,’ and start trying to brow-beat nations into economic sanctions or moving military forces into the region.