Michael
Scheuer highlighted
that immediately following the attacks of 9/11, Sir
John Keegan offered the United States some advice grounded in history when
he warned that,
"Efforts
to occupy and rule [Afghanistan] usually ended in disaster. But straightforward
punitive expeditions...were successful on more than one occasion. It should be
remembered that, in 1878, the British did indeed succeed in bringing the
Afghans to heel [with a punitive expedition]. Lord Roberts' march from 'Kabul
to Khandahar' was one of Victoria's celebrated wars. The Russians, moreover,
foolishly did not try to punish rogue Afghans, as Roberts did, but to rule the
country. Since Afghanistan is ungovernable, the failure of their [1979-92]
effort was predictable...America should not seek to change the regime, but
simply find and kill terrorists. It should do so without pity."
The
U.S. did exactly this, embarking on a punitive expedition, targeting Bin Laden,
his Al Qaeda associates and the Taliban regime which provided him sanctuary.
These goals had largely been accomplished within three months post- 9/11.
CIA operatives and Special Forces teams supported by U.S. air power linked up
with Afghan warlords to conduct a very successful unconventional warfare
campaign against the Taliban regime. As Yaniv
Barzilai has noted, by December 7, 2001 anti-Taliban forces were in control
of every major city in Afghanistan. The Taliban had surrendered its
traditional stronghold of Kandahar and had been pushed into
Pakistan. Those members of Al-Qaeda who had not been killed or
captured, or had not fled Afghanistan before the attacks, were
cornered in Tora Bora along with Bin Laden himself.
At this critical moment in the campaign, the U.S. had,
within striking distance, precisely the tools needed to finish off Bin Laden
and the remaining members of Al Qaeda. Barzilai writes,
For
weeks, Gary Berntsen, the top CIA officer in Afghanistan, pleaded for eight
hundred Army Rangers to seal the six-by-six square mile sierra of Tora Bora.
Then-colonel John Mulholland, the commander of the Special Forces A-teams in
Afghanistan, was “concerned about the inadequacy of the force to the
mission at hand.” General James Mattis, who commanded twelve hundred
Marines at Camp Rhino near Kandahar, asked to reposition his forces to seal the
border at Tora Bora. And, more than one thousand troops from the Tenth Mountain
Division lay ready at Bagram Air Base near Kabul and Kharshi Khanabad in
Uzbekistan.
Instead
of turning the displacement into destruction, GEN Tommy Franks refused requests
to put more U.S. troops on the ground and allowed the “battle for the existence
of Al-Qaeda to be waged by ninety-three Western commandos and a contingent of
generally untrustworthy Afghan rebels without any reliable force to seal the
escape routes." During this time Bin Laden, along with the core of Al Qaeda, was able to slip across the border into
Pakistan undetected. The U.S. would not know his exact location again for
12 years. Decisive victory in Afghanistan was lost in that moment.
Despite
this, victory, albeit a less satisfying one, was still within
the nation’s grasp. The U.S. had accomplished many of its goals by having
displaced the regime that supported Al-Qaeda, forcing the organization out of
Afghanistan and severely damaging it. The U.S.
could have simply left Afghanistan to the opposition forces that
defeated the Taliban and returned home, demonstrating to its enemies that
terror sponsors will be removed from power. It could then have continued
to pursue Bin Laden in Pakistan through more smaller, less costly and maintainable clandestine actions until his final elimination. Though
not decisive, this would have classified as a victory. It certainly
would have been in keeping with the advice of Lord
Roberts, the very British General of whom Sir John Keegan spoke in his
advice to the U.S.:
Instead,
however, the U.S. policy in Afghanistan shifted to one
that has never been one of its strengths - nation-building, and its
consequent condition of long-term occupation. As Alicia
Wittmeyer has noted,
The
West was trying to do something it couldn't do, and it was trying to do
something it didn't need to do. Its basic assumptions were wrong. Afghanistan
did not pose an existential threat to international security; the problem was
not that it was a "failed state." The truth is that the West always
lacked the knowledge, power, or legitimacy to fundamentally transform
Afghanistan. But policymakers were too afraid, too hypnotized by fashionable
theories, too isolated from Afghan reality, and too laden with guilt to notice
that the more ambitious Afghanistan mission was impossible and unnecessary.
In a 2008
interview, COL Gian Gentile asked a question about U.S. policy that has
deep implications:
Presumably
it was to prevent the kind of instability it was thought might create another
opportunity for terrorist safe-haven. But this approach ignored a
critical reality: that the desired outcome was not possible given the
political conditions in the United States and on the conditions on ground in Afghanistan as they
existed then.
The shift from punishing the Taliban and targeting our enemies to nation building resulted in an enemy response: insurgency. Thus the mission became counterinsurgency. A new doctrine was codified to help win the war and its framework imposed on a situation for which it was ill-suited.
Twelve years later, at a cost of almost $1.5 trillion, more than 6,700 dead, and over 50,000 wounded. Bin Laden is dead but Al Qaeda remains intact and has an undeniably larger global footprint. U.S. power, and its ability to to deter, has been irrevocably tarnished. Meanwhile, observers, and even the U.S. government, have noted that Afghanistan is still no less likely, and possibly more likely, to devolve into the same instability feared a decade prior. This is, in any view, a defeat rather than victory, and a costly one at that. It is precisely when U.S. policymakers decided to alter the U.S. role in Afghanistan from punitive action to nation-building, whether in ignorance or denial of the conditions that would preclude the desired outcome, that they sealed the nation’s defeat.
The shift from punishing the Taliban and targeting our enemies to nation building resulted in an enemy response: insurgency. Thus the mission became counterinsurgency. A new doctrine was codified to help win the war and its framework imposed on a situation for which it was ill-suited.
Twelve years later, at a cost of almost $1.5 trillion, more than 6,700 dead, and over 50,000 wounded. Bin Laden is dead but Al Qaeda remains intact and has an undeniably larger global footprint. U.S. power, and its ability to to deter, has been irrevocably tarnished. Meanwhile, observers, and even the U.S. government, have noted that Afghanistan is still no less likely, and possibly more likely, to devolve into the same instability feared a decade prior. This is, in any view, a defeat rather than victory, and a costly one at that. It is precisely when U.S. policymakers decided to alter the U.S. role in Afghanistan from punitive action to nation-building, whether in ignorance or denial of the conditions that would preclude the desired outcome, that they sealed the nation’s defeat.
This is a vital lesson for future interventions.
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